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ABSTRACT 
 
The development of the oil and gas industry is accompanied by high risks that increase 
the potential for major accidents. Improving safety through implementing safety measures 
maintains the risk within an acceptable level and helps to prevent the occurrence of 
accidents. Identifying and treating uncertainty is the main challenge in performing risk 
analysis. This uncertainty reflects the lack of information about the accident scenario and 
its potential causes, as well as the absence of a modeling technique used to model 
accident scenarios. In most situations, there are either few or no data available to perform 
risk analysis. Gathering the required data from other relevant sources is one of the 
solutions to overcome this challenge. 
  
In the presented work, the first part of the developed methodology considers Hierarchical 
Bayesian Analysis (HBA) as a robust technique for an event’s frequency estimation using 
data collected from several sources. Results demonstrate the power of HBA in treating 
the uncertainty within the gathered data and providing the appropriate estimation of an 
event’s frequency. The estimated event’s frequency is then integrated into Bowtie (BT) 
analysis, one of the modeling techniques, in order to predict the occurrence of a major 
accident. Due to their limitations, the standard modeling techniques are unable to capture 
the variation of risks as changes take place in the system. Therefore, their results involve 
a degree of uncertainty, considered as model uncertainty. 
 
 iv 
In the second part of the presented study, the developed methodology has been improved 
by integrating HBA and Bayesian Network (BN) into one framework to cope with data and 
model uncertainties simultaneously. HBA handles the uncertainty within the multi-source 
data, while BN is used to model the accident scenario in order to treat model uncertainty. 
Using HBA along with BN provides more accurate estimations and better handling of 
uncertainties.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
In spite of the magnificent contribution of the oil and gas industry to our world evolution, 
it is accompanied by high risks that able to cause an enormous destruction of humans, 
the environment, and assets. In the history of the oil and gas industry, there have been 
many fatal accidents, major assets’ loss and enormous environmental pollution with a 
considerable death toll. On 6 July 1988, the Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea, UK, 
caused 167 deaths, destroying the entire facility and causing an estimated loss of $1.4bn 
USD [1]. The Alexander L. Kielland platform on the Norwegian Continental Shelf capsized 
in March 1980 and killed 123 people [2]. The Ocean Ranger rig disaster occurred in the 
North Atlantic Sea off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, on 15 February 1982. The rig 
capsized and sank, killing 84 crew members [3]. Recently, the British Petroleum (BP) 
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe on 20 April 2010 killed 11 and injured 17 people in 
addition to being the largest oil spill in history [4]. Safety and risk analysis plays a major 
role in maintaining the risks within acceptable levels and preventing the occurrence of 
major accidents. Expanding the extent of risk analysis by considering dynamic models 
and real-time safety analysis is very important to predict and continuously update the 
likelihood of major accidents in order to prevent them [5]. Uncertainty has an important 
dimension in risk analysis. It may arise due to incomplete information, the inconsistency 
between information sources or because of a model’s structure. The different 
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uncertainties can engender a considerable bias and may lead to improper decision-
making [6]. 
 
1.2 Data uncertainty 
In engineering analysis uncertainty is usually defined as knowledge incompleteness due 
to the deficiency in the knowledge gained, or due to systematic bias [7,8]. Data uncertainty 
is known as the lack of certainty about the correct value of data, which is a challenging 
matter in risk analysis [8]. Data uncertainty in decision and risk analyses might be divided 
into two types: one comes from the variability of the quantity value over time or space, 
which is commonly known as aleatory uncertainty. The other one comes from a basic lack 
of knowledge about the quantity of interest; this type of uncertainty is known as epistemic 
uncertainty [9]. In real world risk analysis problems, the data concerning the interested 
quantities or parameters are usually sparse, because this information is either hard to 
find, obtain or measure, which represents epistemic uncertainty. In such cases, gathering 
a data set for the quantity over various times, spaces or even conditions is usually 
considered a reasonable solution. Nevertheless, this introduces another type of 
uncertainty, which is the variability or the aleatory uncertainty among the aggregated data 
[10]. In practice, the distinction between variability and epistemology is not always clear 
and is often difficult to distinguish. Furthermore, most risk analysis problems must deal 
with both types of uncertainty [11,12]. There is a variety of mathematical tools that can 
accommodate both types of uncertainty at the same time. One such is tool Hierarchical 
Bayesian Analysis (HBA). According to Hayes, et al, “HBA is a Bayesian version of two-
dimensional Monte Carlo analysis in which the moments of variable input distributions are 
 
 
3 
themselves allowed to vary in a parametric manner” [12]. Hierarchical modeling is useful 
when information is available on several different levels of observational units [13]. It is a 
powerful method to address data uncertainty. 
 
1.3 Model uncertainty 
Even if the uncertainty about the quantities or parameters of interest has been addressed 
and treated, there is still another kind of uncertainty related to the model itself. This 
uncertainty concerns the structure of the model and has a considerable effect on the 
results. Overall, uncertainty about the model is harder to detect than the uncertainty about 
a parameter value. In fact, a model is only a simplification of reality, while a real-world 
system includes actions or behaviors that cannot be produced by even the most detailed 
model [6,7]. According to Morgan et al: “Even if a model is a good approximation to a 
particular real-world system and usually gives accurate results, it can never be completely 
exact” [6]. 
 Risk analysis aims to quantify accident scenarios by modeling the contributing events of 
a particular accident using one of the modeling techniques. Event Tree (ET), Fault Tree 
(FT) and Bowtie (BT) analysis are the most popular probabilistic modeling techniques 
used in risk analysis. FT is a graphical deductive model used to identify and determine 
the potential causes of the accident [14]. The primary events (i.e., causes) are linked to 
the top event (i.e., accident) using logical gates. ET is an inductive model used to identify 
the possible outcomes of an initiating event occurrence followed by multiple failures of 
the safety barriers in the system [15]. One of FT’s limitations is the inability to analyze 
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large systems, especially if redundant, common cause failures are presented in the 
system [16]. FTs and ETs are known to have a static structure, so they are not able to 
use real-time data to update the beliefs of primary events and safety barriers [16,17,18]. 
In addition, there is the invalid assumption that considers all events in the FT and ET as 
statistically independent [18]. BT is another modeling technique. It is considered as one 
of the best graphical techniques due to its ability to provide a complete qualitative and 
quantitative representation of the accident scenario, beginning from root causes and 
ending with their consequences [17]. However, BT, in fact, is a combination of FT and 
ET, it suffers from their limitations [5]. These limitations introduce uncertainty in the 
models’ results, which can lead to significantly inappropriate decisions. 
 
1.4 Problem statement 
For many years data scarcity has been a debatable issue in risk analysis. Gathering data 
utilizing a variety of information sources is one of the solutions used to overcome data 
scarcity, but at the same time, it generates a considerable uncertainty associated with 
risk estimation. At first glance, it may seem like averaging data across the sources can 
be a good estimator for the quantity (i.e., parameter) of interest, but that would clearly 
lead to very different, and quite misleading, results. Furthermore, to use these quantities 
in the prediction of a particular accident, they must be incorporated via one of the 
probabilistic modeling techniques (e.g., FT, ET or BT). This would introduce another type 
of uncertainty in the results, known as model uncertainty. In fact, these conventional 
modeling techniques are known to have a static structure and are still unable to handle 
the uncertainty arising from the model due to some limitation such as events’ 
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dependencies and probability updating. Briefly, there is a need for a better understanding 
of the uncertainty associated with risk analysis when dealing with sparse data and to 
identify how it can be modeled to ensure that an appropriate decision can be taken based 
on these results. The following research questions need to be addressed:  
1. How to overcome data scarcity in risk analysis of major accidents?  
2. How to address and treat the uncertainty within this kind of data? 
3. Is it possible to reduce the effects of the conventional techniques’ limitations? 
4. Is there a way to treat data and model uncertainty simultaneously, in order to 
have a total uncertainty management? 
 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The presented study concerns with addressing and treating two types of uncertainty 
associated with risk analysis of major accidents. First, the study focused on data 
uncertainty arising from gathering the data from multi-sources due to sparse or lack of 
information regarding the accident’s contributing events. Then the study turned to address 
another type of uncertainty known as model uncertainty, which occurs due to the 
limitations of the model used to incorporate the contributing events to predict the 
frequency of an accident. In this way, both data and model uncertainty can be addressed. 
The case studies that have been used to demonstrate the application of the proposed 
methodology are selected from historical major accidents in offshore oil and gas facilities. 
In each case, a different probabilistic model is used in order to validate the flexibility of 
this methodology to be applied to various models. Since every undertaking has specific 
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limitations, the probabilistic models (i.e., FT, ET, and BT) that have been constructed to 
illustrate accidents’ scenarios can be more complex, considering all the potential causes 
of the accident. However, this is not the concern of the current research. These models 
include only the main causes, safety barriers, and consequences. In addition, most data 
in the presented study is either adopted from literature or expert opinion data, in order to 
apply the methodology. The main objectives of this work can be expressed as: 
➢ Addressing and treating two types of uncertainty associated with risk analysis of 
major accidents.  
➢ Provide a unique methodology that can be used as a dynamic tool for modeling 
major accidents using sparse data  
 
1.6 Contribution 
In this research, a methodology is developed considering Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis 
(HBA) as a robust technique for event frequency estimation. Here, HBA is used to treat 
source-to-source uncertainty among the aggregated data for each contributing event in 
the accident scenario. HBA provides a precise value for the parameter of interest (e.g. 
failure rate, probability or time to failure). The estimated event’s parameter is reintegrated 
via probabilistic modeling techniques such as Bowtie analysis to estimate the probability 
of a particular major accident. The application of the proposed methodology to risk 
analysis is illustrated using a case study of an offshore major accident and its 
effectiveness over the traditional statistical estimators is demonstrated. The results 
illustrate that the developed methodology assists in making better estimates of the 
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probabilities when dealing with sparse data. The ability to update the primary event and 
safety barrier probabilities as new data become available, further enhances its 
effectiveness. 
Despite that, the first part of this research has shown the effectiveness of HBA in deriving 
the probabilities of an accident’s contributing events when no or few data are available, 
yet incorporating these probabilities via FT, ET or BT to obtain the frequency of a major 
accident may introduce uncertainty due to their static structure. The conventional 
modeling techniques are unable to handle the uncertainty arising from the model. They 
suffer some limitations concerning events’ dependencies and probability updating. These 
limitations can be effectively eliminated by mapping the conventional technique into a 
Bayesian Network (BN), to enable updating of probabilities and represent the 
dependencies of events.  
The present research has developed a framework that combines the use of HBA along 
with BN in order to consider both data uncertainty and model uncertainty in the estimation 
process of a major accident. This work provides a unique methodology that can be used 
as a dynamic tool for modeling major accidents using sparse data.  
 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is written in manuscript style (paper based). The outline of each chapter is 
explained below:  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review related to this work. The literature review 
essentially discusses the obstacle of data scarcity in risk analysis, how it has been 
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resolved, and how data and model uncertainty associated with risk analysis have been 
treated so far.  
Chapter 3 discusses data uncertainty in the risk analysis of major accidents. This chapter 
presents a developed methodology using Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) for 
events’ frequency estimation based on sparse data. It is shown that HBA is able to reduce 
the uncertainty of final results better than a traditional method. This chapter was published 
in the Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the limitations of the conventional modeling techniques that 
represent model uncertainty. This chapter introduces a developed framework that 
combines the proposed methodology in chapter 3 with the Bayesian network instead of 
using conventional techniques (i.e., FT, ET, and BT). This framework aims to address 
both data and model uncertainty. This chapter was published in the ASCE-ASME Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems. 
Chapter 5 reports the summary of the thesis and the main conclusions drawn from this 
work. In addition, recommendations for future work are presented. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Rare events 
Rare events are events that though not often happen, illustrate the most critical 
consequences of uncertainty and random effects [24]. The prediction of such events is a 
challenge, due to their small occurrence frequency [25]. Even the causal factors that lead 
to those events usually have small probabilities and insufficient information. In risk 
analysis, a major accident is the undesirable rare event that directly or indirectly causes 
loss of human life, several serious injuries, serious environmental damage, and loss of 
essential material assets. The release of toxic materials, fire and explosion, and spillage 
of hazardous chemicals are typical examples of major accidents [26,27,28]. Catastrophic 
accidents such as the loss of the Alexander L. Kielland, which capsized in 1980, the Piper 
Alpha fire and explosion in 1988, and the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010 
demonstrate the dramatic consequences of major accidents in offshore oil and gas 
activities [29]. Therefore, early prediction of potential accidents and associated causes is 
necessary to improve the safety systems and to prevent the future occurrence of such 
accidents. Classical approaches to estimate rare events perform poorly because few data 
are available. However, many attempts in the literature have used different approaches 
in the context of major accidents’ prediction, such as Bayesian theory [30], accident 
precursor data approaches [21,22,31], empirical Bayes [32] and the Gaussian sampling 
process [24]. 
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2.2 Data Uncertainty 
In most industrial applications, only limited information is available to describe a particular 
quantity, either due to expensive testing costs or the incapability of testing, especially in 
harsh environments [1]. Data scarcity is one of the most challenging problems in 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA); this problem generates one of the uncertainty types 
in the results. This type of uncertainty represents the lack of knowledge about the proper 
value to use for a quantity and is known as epistemic uncertainty [2]. It has been 
addressed by many mathematical methods such as sensitivity analysis [3], interval 
analysis [4] and qualitative modeling [5,6]. However, this uncertainty can also be reduced 
through increased understanding by gathering more relevant data. In real world risk 
analysis, gathering data over different operational conditions, regions, industry sectors or 
different experts is the only solution to overcome data scarcity. Consequently, this 
introduces variability or aleatory uncertainty among the aggregated data [7]. It may 
appear that averaging the aggregated data can be a good estimator for the quantity (i.e., 
parameter), but that would lead to very different and misleading results [8].  
 
In fact, it is very difficult to distinguish between variability and epistemology. In the 
literature, there are many mathematical methods used to simultaneously treat variability 
and epistemology, such as probability bounds analysis [9], Fuzzy sets and arithmetic [10] 
and Hierarchical Bayesian analysis [11,12].  
 
Bayesian approaches are known for their ability to incorporate a wide variety of 
information types such as extrapolated data, experts’ judgments or partially related data 
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[13]. Kaplan [14] has presented a two-stage Bayesian procedure by combining three 
sources of failure data for a certain machine, which was the first effective modeling 
approach developed to address plant to plant variability in order to cope with a paucity of 
data [15]. Also, in [16] a Bayes procedure was applied to combine five different sources 
of data of low probability events, in order to overcome data scarcity.  
 
Indeed, the two-stage Bayesian approach can simply be considered as more general 
hierarchical Bayes [17]. The Hierarchical Bayesian approach (HBA) has been effectively 
used to treat source-to-source uncertainty by developing a multi-stage prior for the 
parameter of interest [16,17,18,19]. Furthermore, in major accident risk analysis, the 
precursor-based risk analysis has been extensively applied for the purpose of bringing 
data scarcity under control. Researchers in [20,21,22,23] applied HBA to implement the 
application of precursor data analysis in the prediction of major accidents. Most of these 
precursor data were collected from different regions, and even the regional data were 
collected during different wells’ activities and types of wells [20]. This makes the 
contributing events of the accident and the relevant safety barriers vary in each situation. 
For instance, the number of offshore blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico discussed in previous 
research [20,22,23] included those blowouts resulting from ship collisions and natural 
hazards such as storms and hurricanes, which means that the collected data do not reflect 
the inherent mechanism of the accident of concern.  
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2.3 Model Uncertainty  
Modeling the accident scenario provides better understanding and clarifies the factors 
that can possibly contribute to the accident as well as the possible factors that may be 
added to the system to improve safety, in order to prevent the accident. According to 
Houston [34], lawyers and insurers have developed one of the classical models based on 
the ‘proximate cause’. One of the weaknesses of this approach is that there is no objective 
standard for identifying the principal cause, and no clear relationships among causes 
[33,34]. 
 
In addition, Kletz [35] has developed a model focused on accident investigation. The 
model identifies the possible actions and sequence of decisions that might lead to an 
accident. Also, it shows the recommendations arising from the investigation against each 
step. Additionally, a model that underlines the broader socio-technical background to 
accidents has been developed by Geyer and Bellamy [33,35,36]. 
 
In risk analysis, Fault Tree (FT), Event Tree (ET) and Bowtie (BT) are considered the 
most popular probabilistic modeling techniques used to identify and analyze accident 
scenarios [33]. They are mostly known as conventional methods. However, because they 
have some limitations, another probabilistic method based on Bayes' rule known as 
Bayesian Network (BN), has become more popular in safety and risk analysis. The 
following subsections briefly discuss the previous methods: 
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2.3.1 Fault Tree 
As described by Clemens [37]: “FT is a graphical model which represents the pathways 
within the system that can lead to an undesirable event, using standard logic symbols to 
represent the pathways connecting the contributing events and conditions. The probability 
of the undesirable event can be evaluated by propagating the probabilities of the 
contributing events through the model”. H.A. Watson originally developed FT in 1962 at 
Bell Laboratories for the US Air Force to be used to evaluate the Minuteman Control 
System [38]. Then it was adopted and extensively applied by the Boeing Company. Later, 
the use of fault trees spread dramatically [39]. 
 
2.3.2 Event Tree 
ET is an inductive model used to identify the possible outcomes of an initiating event 
occurrence followed by multiple failures of the safety barriers in the system [40]. ET is a 
second form of a decision tree for evaluating the multiple decision paths in a given system. 
It was first presented during the WASH-1400 [41] nuclear power plant safety study (circa 
1974). The WASH-1400 team found that the fault tree was not helpful for their analysis, 
due to it being too large, so they needed an alternative method [42].  
 
Even though they have some limitations, FT and ET techniques have been extensively 
used in the field of risk analysis [43]. They are unable to capture the variation of risks as 
changes in the system take place, as they are known to have a static structure [44,45].  
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2.3.3 Bowtie 
Bowtie (BT) is one of the popular tools used in several safety and risk frameworks due to 
its ability to integrate all the root causes, consequences and relative safety barriers of an 
accident scenario in one model [46]. However, BT still suffers the same limitations as do 
FT and ET, as it is constituted by combining fault and event trees. These limitations 
generate a type of uncertainty in the results, which is considered to be model uncertainty. 
Consequently, there is a need to develop more dynamic risk analysis models. 
 
2.3.4 Bayesian Network 
Dynamic risk assessment methods are able to re-evaluate the risk during any stage in 
the operation, by updating initial failure probabilities of events as new information 
becomes available [45]. Bayesian Network (BN) is one of the dynamic tools that have 
been used in reconsidering prior failure probabilities. The new data in the form of 
likelihood functions are used with Bayes’ theorem to update the priors. BNs are used as 
a dynamic tool instead of the conventional static risk analysis models. There were many 
attempts in the literature to map FT into BN [43,47,48,49]. Others [50,51] tried to convert 
ET into BN, and in [46] a BT model was mapped into BN. The efficiency of BN is its ability 
to be used in two ways: i) to represent causation dependency and occurrence to estimate 
accident probability, in addition to the possibility of including evidence at any stage of the 
BN; ii) to explain the most probable causes or causal pathways, given the occurrence of 
an accident or event. 
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However, the attempts to handle both data and model uncertainty were insufficient in the 
literature, particularly in the field of risk analysis in the oil and gas industries. The main 
focus of past works was mainly to cope with model uncertainty, by making the 
conventional modeling techniques more dynamic. Some authors used Bayesian 
inference, in which Bayes' theorem is coupled with a standard fault tree [52], event tree 
[53], and bow-tie analysis [54]. Others mapped the standard techniques into Bayesian 
networks [46,47,50].  
Therefore, integrating HBA and BN into one framework provides better estimations and 
has the potential to deal with data and model uncertainties simultaneously, which is 
attempted in this study. The study presents the developed framework in detail in two 
chapters and each chapter has its own literature review. 
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3. Major Accident Modeling Using Spare Data 
  
 
Preface   
A version of this manuscript has been published in the Journal of Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection. I am the principal author and the co-authors are Dr. Khan, Dr. 
Abbassi and Ms. Chen. With the assistance of Dr. Khan, I have developed the 
methodology. Subsequently, I have developed and tested the model with the assistance 
of my supervisor (Dr. Khan) and analyzed the results. I have written the first draft; 
coauthors (Drs. Khan and Abbassi, and Ms. Chen) have reviewed and provided feedback. 
I have revised the draft and with their help and support published this work. 
 
 
 
Abstract: In the field of risk and reliability analysis, the information available to acquire 
probabilities is usually insufficient (i.e. scarce, missing). Utilizing a variety of information 
sources introduces different types of uncertainties associated with risk estimation. This is 
an obstacle in the prediction of major accidents which have significant consequences for 
human life and the environment, in addition to incurring financial losses. In order to get 
reasonable results and to support decision making in a cost effective manner, there is a 
need to aggregate the relevant data from different regions, operational conditions and 
different sectors (e.g. chemical, nuclear or mining). In this paper, a methodology is 
developed considering Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) as a robust technique for 
event frequency estimation. Here, HBA is able to treat source-to-source uncertainty 
among the aggregated data for each event and provide a precise value for the parameter 
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of interest (e.g. failure rate, probability or time to failure). The estimated event’s parameter 
is reintegrated via probabilistic modeling techniques such as Bowtie (BT) analysis to 
estimate the probability of major accidents. The application of the proposed methodology 
to risk analysis is illustrated using a case study of an offshore major accident and its 
effectiveness is demonstrated over the traditional statistical estimators. The results 
illustrate that the developed methodology assists in making better estimates of the 
probabilities when dealing with sparse data. The ability to update the primary event and 
safety barrier probabilities as new data become available, further enhances its 
usefulness. 
 
Keywords:  Data scarcity; Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis; Risk analysis; Offshore major 
accidents.  
 
3.1   Introduction 
A major accident is defined as a serious undesirable event that directly or indirectly 
causes several serious injuries, loss of human life, serious environmental damage, and 
loss of essential material assets. The release of toxic materials, fire and explosion, and 
spillage of hazardous chemicals are typical examples of major accidents [1,2,3]. 
Catastrophic accidents such as the Alexander L. Kielland capsized in 1980, the Piper 
Alpha fire and explosion in 1988 and the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010 
demonstrate the dramatic consequences of major accidents in offshore oil and gas 
activities [4]. Therefore, early prediction of the potential accidents and associated causes 
is necessary to improve the safety systems and to prevent the future occurrence of such 
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accidents. Data scarcity is one of the most challenging problems in probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) and this increases the uncertainty associated with analyzing the 
frequency of major accidents. However, in real world industry, the available information 
on the frequency of contributing causes is not sufficient (e.g. limitation of knowledge, 
systematic bias or missing data). Therefore, gathering data from different sources with 
dissimilar characteristics such as different operational conditions, regions, industry 
sectors or different experts (considering experts’ judgment), is one solution that has been 
widely used to overcome the problem of data scarcity. In addition, a robust technique is 
needed for the estimation process to address the uncertainty in the collected data. 
Bayesian approaches are able to incorporate a wide variety of information types such as 
extrapolated data, experts’ judgments or partially related data [5]. To overcome data 
scarcity, a Bayes procedure was applied to combine five different sources of data of low 
probability events [6]. Kaplan [7] presented a two-stage Bayesian procedure by combining 
three sources of failure data for a certain machine, which was an effective modeling 
approach developed to address plant to plant variability in order to cope with a paucity of 
data [8]. In fact, a two-stage Bayesian approach can be considered as more general 
hierarchical Bayes [9]. The Hierarchical Bayesian approach (HBA) has been extensively 
used to address source-to-source uncertainty by developing a multi-stage prior for the 
parameter of interest [8,9,10,11]. To overcome the data scarcity problem, precursor-
based risk analysis has been effectively applied in major accident risk analysis. Previous 
researchers [12,13,14,15] applied HBA to implement the application of precursor data 
analysis. The main challenge was that most of these precursor data were gathered from 
different regions, and even the regional data were collected during different well’s 
27 
 
activities and for different types of wells [12]. Thus the contributing events of the accident 
and the relevant safety barriers will be varying in each circumstance, which means the 
collected data does not reflect the inherent mechanism of the accident of concern. For 
instance, the number of offshore blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico, discussed in previous 
research [12,14,15] included those blowouts resulting from ship collisions and natural 
hazards such as storms and hurricanes. As the modeled major accident considers a set 
of its contributing events along with their logical relationships, the probability of an 
accident may be obtained by incorporating those events’ probabilities via different 
accident modeling tools such as Bow-tie analysis. The probabilities of contributing events 
are derived using historical data, which are usually aggregated from sources with different 
locative and operational characteristics. Therefore, the risk analysis is associated with a 
degree of uncertainty, known as source-to-source variability [12,16]. 
 
This paper aims to develop a methodology for dealing with the uncertainty associated 
with the sparse data in accident modeling and risk analysis by applying HBA. Considering 
the objective of the proposed study, section 2 presents a brief description of HBA, 
illustrating it with a simple example. The proposed methodology is discussed in detail in 
section 3, and section 4 presents the application of methodology using a case study from 
previous major accidents in offshore oil and gas facilities. Section 5 is devoted to the 
conclusions of this work. 
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3.2   Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA)     
HBA is one of the useful techniques in probabilistic risk analysis, especially for cases with 
scarce or no data. For this purpose, HBA is able to incorporate a wide variety of 
information in the estimation process considering source-to-source variability in the 
aggregated dataset [8,12,17]. Developing an appropriate prior distribution is the 
debatable part of any Bayesian method [8,14]. In the past, the two-stage Bayesian and 
empirical Bayes were commonly used in PRA; both are approximations to hierarchical 
Bayes [7,9]. HBA utilizes a multistage prior distribution in the hierarchical model, which is 
very complex to analyze numerically [14]. Recently, the availability of Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) based sampling software makes a fully hierarchical Bayes analysis 
tractable [9,11]. As data scarcity is a very common problem in PRA, there is a need to 
aggregate data from a variety of sources. In the first step of HBA, a likelihood function 
with a parameter of interest ϕ will be specified for the data set (𝑦). An informative prior 
distribution can be developed for this parameter by considering that the parameter ϕ 
follows a generic distribution ϕ~ω0(ϕ|α,β)representing the first stage prior distribution 
with its own parameters α and β, which are known as hyper parameters [8]. The hyper 
parameters are also uncertain and are considered to follow a diffusive or non-informative 
distribution 𝑔0(α, β) which is known as second stage prior or hyper prior distribution.  
 
The data set (𝑦) along with Bayes theorem can be used to update the second stage prior 
distribution in order to have a posterior distribution for α and β, 𝑔1(α, β|y). This posterior 
distribution is used to update the first stage prior distribution ω0(ϕ|α, β) to obtain the 
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posterior predictive distribution  ω1(ϕ|y), which is known as the population variability 
curve (PVC), and can be written as [8,11,15]: 
 
ω1(ϕ|y) =  ∬ ω0(ϕ|α, β) 𝑔1(α, β|y) 𝑑α dβ                                                                                 (3 − 1) 
This distribution represents the source–to-source uncertainty in ϕ and can be used as an 
informative prior distribution when more case-specific data become available [8,11]: 
 
ω1(ϕ|𝑦
∗, y) =
ω1(ϕ|y) 𝐿(y
∗|ϕ)
∫ ω1(ϕ|y) 𝐿(y
∗|ϕ)dϕ
                                                                                            (3 − 2) 
 
ω1(ϕ|𝑦
∗, y)  ∝  ω1(ϕ|y)𝐿(y
∗|ϕ)                                                                                                     (3 − 3) 
 
Assume that the failure data were collected for a certain device in the system from 10 
different sources. The failure data represented in the number of failures (𝑦𝑖) in a specific 
number of demands (𝑁𝑖) is shown in Table 3.1. The objective is to obtain one value out 
of these 10 sources to represent the failure probability of this device. In such cases, the 
average (i.e., traditional method) is usually used as the best estimator to represent the 
device’s failure probability. In fact, this may lead to significant uncertainty in the final 
results. HBA based on these data is able to provide a distribution of the failure probability. 
The mean of this estimated distribution is the most appropriate value to represent the 
failure probability of this device. 
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Table 3.1. Failure data collected from 10 sources [8]. 
Source Number of 
failures (𝒚𝒊) 
Number of 
trails (𝑵𝒊) 
1 0 140 
2 0 130 
3 0 130 
4 1 130 
5 2 100 
6 3 185 
7 3 175 
8 4 167 
9 5 151 
10 10 150 
 
The number of failures (𝑦𝑖)  can be modeled using binomial likelihood 𝐿(𝑦|𝑝) with 
parameter of interest 𝑝 . The parameter p is unknown and is assumed to follow the 
conjugate prior beta distribution ω0(𝑝|𝑎, 𝑏)  with hyper parameters 𝑎  and 𝑏 , while an 
independent diffusive distribution 𝑔0(𝑎, 𝑏)  is assumed for 𝑎  and 𝑏 . The posterior 
predictive distribution of 𝑝  representing source-to-source uncertainty ω1(𝑝|𝑦), can be 
generated by sampling the hyper parameters (𝑎, 𝑏) from their joint posterior distribution 
𝑔1(𝑎, 𝑏|𝑦). Then sampling the posterior predictive distribution from the first stage prior 
beta distribution is as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖 ~ 𝑏𝑖𝑛 (𝑝𝑖, 𝑛𝑖)                               likelihood function 
𝑝𝑖~ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 (𝑎, 𝑏)                                first stage conjugate prior   
𝑎~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)     diffusive hyper prior 
𝑏~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)     diffusive hyper prior 
 
This model is coded in OpenBUGS; a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) software tool 
[11,17,18]. A posterior distribution of the probability of failure is obtained as illustrated in 
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Figure 3.1, with the mean value of 0.02085 that represents the precise value for the 
component failure probability with a 95% confidence interval (9.256E-5, 0.08406). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Predictive posterior distribution for the probability of failure 
 
Assuming that one new data point is available (e.g., 𝑦 = 7 failures on 𝑛 = 125 trials), the 
probability of failure can be updated. This posterior predictive distribution can be 
considered as an informative prior distribution of the parameter of interest 𝑝  (i.e., 
probability of failure). As the informative distribution is beta conjugate prior, the updated 
distribution will be beta distribution with a mean of (𝑎𝑚 + 𝑦)/(𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 + 𝑛), where 𝑎𝑚and 
𝑏𝑚are the mean values of the joint posterior distributions of 𝑎, 𝑏. 
 
Table 3.2. Comparing results for the probability of failure 
Sample 
size 
Traditional 
method 
HBA Relative 
difference 
10 data 
points 
 
New 
data 
0.018478 
 
 
0.021889 
0.02085 
 
 
0.02645 
12.8% 
 
 
20.8% 
 
The relative difference is used as a measure to compare the two methods. Results in 
Table 3.2 show that the probability obtained using HBA is 12.8% higher than the one 
obtained by using the average. When a new data point becomes available, the posterior 
 
 
Probability of Failure 
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predictive distribution obtained by HBA is used as informative prior distribution to update 
the probability. The updated probability was 20% higher than the value obtained by re-
averaging the data set. Therefore, if the average is used as an estimator to represent the 
failure probability of this device, this could provide a significant variation in the results.    
 
3.3  Developed Methodology  
Major accidents have a significant impact on humans and the environment in addition to 
incurring financial losses. By integrating the accident’s contributing events’ probabilities 
through one of the probabilistic modeling techniques, the probability of an accident is 
predicted. In the real world, data related to these contributing events are usually scattered 
and must be collected from different types of sources. Additionally, it is sometimes difficult 
or expensive to measure a certain parameter, especially in a harsh environment, so 
aggregating related data from other areas is a good choice in such cases. The developed 
methodology in this paper is a robust technique to treat the uncertainty among these data 
and provide a precise value for the parameter of interest. Figure 3.2 presents the 
developed methodology framework and the main steps of the proposed methodology are 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
Stage 1: Defining accident scenario 
Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis (FTA and ETA) are conventional failure assessment 
techniques, extensively used in risk analysis. FTA uses a deductive approach and 
logically relates the occurrence of contributing events to the higher level event which is 
the accident [25]. ETA identifies the possible outcomes following an initiating event 
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occurrence and multiple failures of the safety barriers in the system [26]. Bowtie (BT) is a 
graphical model composed of FTA and ETA. BT is effectively used in risk analysis 
[19,20,21], due to its ability to identify all the possible root causes, consequences and 
relative safety barriers of the accident scenario in a single model. According to the 
international standard ISO 31000:2009 and ISO/IEC 31010:2009, identifying the potential 
hazards in a specific scenario is the first step to defining a particular accident scenario 
[27,28].  
 
Stage 2: Data collection 
Failure data for each basic event and safety barrier can be collected from different 
sources such as different regions, operational conditions, and different industries. Also, 
data can be collected considering experts’ judgment, which is very helpful for newly 
designed installations in which no experimental observations are possible [22]. Deriving 
the data considering experts’ judgment is another useful technique to acquire the failure 
probabilities whenever there is no access to such probabilities for a particular failure, 
especially in a harsh environment. 
 
Stage 3: Developing the HBA 
HBA is used to derive the probability for each basic event and safety barrier. Considering 
the type of aggregated data, a likelihood function will be specified for each data set. For 
instance, if the number of failures in a certain period of time is collected, a Poisson 
likelihood function can be adopted to model the data set and the hierarchical model will 
be written as: 
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𝑥𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛 (𝜆𝑖, 𝑡𝑖)                     likelihood 
𝜆𝑖~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝛼, 𝛽)                        first stage prior 
𝛼~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)    hyper prior 
𝛽~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)    hyper prior 
 
If the time is observed at which random events occur (i.e., time to failure), an exponential 
likelihood function may be used to model the data set and the hierarchical model will be 
written as: 
 
𝑡𝑖 ~ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝜆𝑖)                   likelihood 
𝜆𝑖~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝛼, 𝛽)                        first stage prior 
𝛼~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)    hyper prior 
𝛽~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)    hyper prior 
 
HBA provides a posterior distribution for the parameter of interest with mean value and 
confidence intervals. The mean value represents the precise value of the parameter of 
interest. This distribution represents the source-to-source uncertainty in the collected data 
and is used as an informative prior distribution when more case-specific data become 
available. 
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Figure 3.2. Proposed methodology framework 
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Stage 4: Major accident probability estimation and updating  
 
By obtaining the probability of failure or occurrence for each contributory event, these 
probabilities can be reintegrated via the known accident modeling techniques such as BT 
to obtain the final probability of a major accident. When new data related to any event 
become available, the event’s probability can be updated. Where the posterior distribution 
for this event that obtained from HBA is considered as informative prior distribution and it 
is used to update the probability. Once an event’s probability is updated, it is reintegrated 
through the model to obtain a new probability of the accident. This dynamic feature of 
updating improves a modeling technique such as BT, which is known to have a static 
structure.   
 
3.4   Application of the methodology: Case study    
 
The application of the developed methodology is demonstrated using the following 
accident scenario in the offshore oil and gas industry.  
 
Fires and explosions are the most significant causes of harm and damage to equipment 
and may lead to injuries and deaths in the industry, especially in the offshore oil and gas 
sector [23]. The Piper Alpha disaster, which killed 167 workers on 6 July 1988 off the 
coast of Aberdeen, Scotland, was the world's deadliest oil rig accident [24]. As a result of 
a preventive maintenance procedure, condensate gas leaked out and ignited while the 
firewalls that would have resisted fire failed to cope with the ensuing gas explosion. Here 
the BT model is developed for the sake of clarifying the application of the methodology in 
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handling the data scarcity in risk analysis (Figure 3.3). The BT model can be more 
complex, considering all the potential causes of the accident. However, it is not the 
concern of the current study. This model includes only the major causes and 
consequences, which occurred in the condensate gas leak. 
 
 
                                   Figure 3.3. A Bow-tie model for platform fire and explosion 
 
To demonstrate the methodology, 10 data points consider the number of occurrences of 
each basic event in a certain operational time, illustrated in Table 3.3. In addition, the 
number of successes for each safety barrier out of the number of gas leaks Ni is assumed. 
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Table 3.3. The number of occurrences of basic events and safety barriers 
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Based on the type of these data, each event’s data set can be modeled. The number of 
occurrences for each basic event, 𝑥𝑖, was modeled using a Poisson distribution with 
parameter of interest 𝜆. 𝜆 is the occurrence rate, which is unknown and is assumed to 
follow the conjugate prior gamma distribution with hyper parameters 𝛼, 𝛽. An independent 
diffusive distribution is assumed for 𝛼, 𝛽. As a result, a posterior predictive distribution is 
generated for the occurrence rate of each basic event as illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
 
𝑥𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛 (𝜆𝑖, 𝑡𝑖) 
𝜆𝑖 ~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝛼, 𝛽) 
𝛼 ~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001) 
𝛽 ~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001) 
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Figure 3.4. Posterior predictive distribution for the occurrence rate of basic events 
 
 
The mean value of the posterior predictive distribution represents the precise value of the 
occurrence rate 𝜆 for the basic event. Table 3.4 presents the resulting occurrence rate for 
each basic event, as well as the 95% confidence interval, which represents the 
uncertainty in that estimated value.  
 
In comparison, a traditional method is used to aggregate the collected data, simply by 
taking the average to obtain the occurrence rate of each basic event. The 95% confidence 
interval is estimated as well. The results summary in Table 3.4 demonstrates the variation 
between the two methods’ estimation. As for the communication failure event, the 
occurrence rate estimated by the average is much lower than the one obtained by HBA, 
while in the ‘primary pump fails’ event the average is much higher than HBA estimates. 
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That is interpreted by the sensitivity of the average to the large or small data points in the 
dataset; therefore, its influence on those values is introducing a bias in the results.  
 
Table 3.4. Basic events’ occurrence rate and the 95% confidence intervals 
           Approach 
              
     Event 
HBA Traditional method 
Occurrence rate  95%Confidence 
interval 
Occurrence rate  95% Confidence 
interval 
Poor blanking 
job 
0.9668 (0.4914, 1.564) 0.930 (0.384, 1.476) 
Communication 
failure 
0.9900 (0.2545, 2.2200) 0.943 (0.444, 1.442) 
Poor inspection 
 
0.7746 (0.2912,1.487) 0.843 (0.344, 1.343) 
Primary pump 
fails 
1.4280 (0.8414, 2.295) 1.733 (1.151, 2.315) 
 
 
On the other hand, the number of successes for each safety barrier 𝑦𝑖 is modeled using 
binomial distribution with unknown parameter 𝑝 that represents the probability of success. 
The parameter 𝑝 is assumed to follow the conjugate prior beta distribution with hyper 
parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏, which are assumed to follow an independent diffusive distribution. 
 
𝑦𝑖 ~ 𝑏𝑖𝑛 (𝑝𝑖, 𝑛𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖~ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 (𝑎, 𝑏) 
𝑎~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001) 
𝑏~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001) 
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Figure 3.5. Posterior predictive distribution for the probability of success of safety barriers  
 
 
Figure 3.5 represents the posterior predictive distribution generated for the probability of 
success for each safety barrier. The mean values of the posterior predictive distributions, 
which represent the precise values of the safety barriers’ occurrence probability with 95% 
confidence intervals, are shown in Table 3.5. 
  
Table 3.5. Safety barriers’ probability of success and the 95% confidence intervals 
        Approach  
 
       Event    
HBA 
Traditional method 
Probability 95%Confidence 
interval 
Probability 95% Confidence 
interval 
Ignition avoided 
 
0.5916 (0.3302, 0.8351) 0.7273 (0.5424, 0.9122) 
Spill size 
reduction 
0.7027 (0.4791, 0.8937) 0.7258 (0.5114, 0.9402) 
Escalation 
prevention 
0.6781 (0.4345, 0.8753) 0.658 (0.408, 0.907) 
Evacuation 0.8414 (0.6474, 0.9643) 0.8227 (0.6217, 1.0238) 
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At the same time, the probability of success for each safety barrier is obtained using the 
traditional method as well as a 95% confidence interval. Comparing the results in Table 
3.5, a significant bias in the probability values and their confidence intervals that are 
obtained using the traditional approach is observed. Therefore, to rely on those values in 
estimating the frequency of major accidents is a blunder.    
 
Basic events’ and safety barriers’ probabilities from both methods are used in the Bowtie 
analysis to estimate the initial event and consequences probabilities. After new data for 
basic events and safety barriers become available, their probabilities are updated by 
using the informative prior distributions obtained from the previous HBA modeling. The 
probability of occurrence of the initial event and consequences is then re-estimated using 
forward analysis as shown in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6. Results comparison for the basic events and initial event occurrence probabilities, safety 
barriers probabilities of success  
 
 
Event 
Probability 
 
 
Relative 
difference % 
Updated 
probability 
 
 
Relative 
difference % 
HBA Avg HBA Avg 
Poor blanking job 0.6197 0.6054 2.36 0.6097 0.6310 -3.37 
Communication 
failure 
0.5281 0.6106 -13.51 0.5051 0.6242 -19.08 
Poor inspection 0.5391 0.5697 -5.37 0.5162 0.5758 -10.35 
Primary pump fails 0.7602 0.8233 -7.66 0.7263 0.8275 -12.22 
Gas leak 0.0707 0.1058 -33.17 0.0582 0.1171 -50.29 
Ignition avoided 0.5916 0.7272 -18.64 0.5887 0.6666 -11.68 
Spill size reduction 0.7027 0.7257 -3.16 0.7100 0.7069 0.43 
Escalation 
prevention 
0.6781 0.6575 3.13 0.7125 0.6444 10.56 
Evacuation 0.8414 0.8227 2.27 0.8531 0.8375 1.86 
Gas dispersion 0.0418 0.0769 -45.64 0.0342 0.0780 -56.15 
Primary explosion 0.0202 0.0209 -3.34 0.0169 0.0275 -38.54 
Extensive fire/ 
structural damage 
0.00582 0.0052 11.92 0.00494 0.0073 -32.32 
Massive explosion 
/fireball/rig total loss 
0.0023 0.0022 4.54 0.0017 0.0034 -50 
Total loss of rig/ 
fatalities 
0.00043 0.00048 -10.41 0.00029 0.00066 -56.06 
 
 
 
The relative difference is used as a comparison between the two approaches. As may be 
observed from the comparative analysis, the relative difference between the two 
approaches increases sharply as the probability gets updated considering new evidence 
(information). This highlights that HBA is an adaptive approach, where data uncertainty 
decreases as new evidence is considered in the probability updating. In limiting 
conditions, when new evidence is close to the mean probability value of the probability, 
the differences between two approaches converge, as may be seen for spill size 
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reduction, ignition avoided, and evacuation events. Therefore, HBA is an adaptive 
approach, considering new evidence and then updating, while the traditional approach is 
simply adding data to the numerator and estimating the new average and new interval. 
As shown in Table 3.6, the positive relative difference indicates that the HBA result is 
higher than the average estimate, whereas the negative sign indicates that the HBA result 
is less than the average. This means that the average values are either underestimating 
or overestimating the probability for the parameter of interest. It is well known that the 
average is very sensitive to outliers in the dataset, and is strongly influenced by data 
points of large values or small values, which is not reflective of the center of data tendency 
and may lead to a significant bias in the results.  
 
3.5  Conclusion  
In risk analysis of major accidents, there are always different uncertainties associated 
with data sought from different regional and global sources. Therefore, it is necessary to 
identify and consider the uncertainty that arises in the collected data. The methodology 
developed in this study considers HBA to address the uncertainty.  It does this by 
modeling the collected data for each event, in order to obtain a posterior predictive 
distribution for the event’s parameter (e.g., probability or failure rate) with the mean and 
confidence interval. In similar situations, the average value is mostly used as the best 
estimator to represent an event’s parameter value. The relative difference is used as 
evidence of the effectiveness of the developed methodology. Events’ probabilities 
obtained by HBA are modeled using BT analysis in order to obtain the probability of a 
major accident in the case study. Results demonstrate that when dealing with sparse 
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data, the new methodology effectively addresses data uncertainty, in addition to its ability 
to update events’ probabilities separately, or together, when new data become available. 
However, BT is considered as one of the conventional modeling techniques. Due to its 
static structure, BT is still unable to handle a degree of uncertainty arising from the model 
because of some limitation such as events’ dependencies. Thus, to further improve this 
work, the use of HBA along with a Bayesian Network is recommended, which would 
generate a powerful tool able to consider both data uncertainty and model uncertainty. 
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4 Rare Event Analysis Considering Data and Model Uncertainty 
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Abstract: In risk analysis of rare events there is a need to adopt data from different 
sources with varying levels of detail (e.g. local, regional, categorical data). Therefore, it is 
very important to identify, understand and incorporate the uncertainty that accompanies 
the data. Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) addresses uncertainty among the 
aggregated data for each event through generating an informative prior distribution for 
the event’s parameter of interest. Bayesian Network (BN) approach is used to model 
accident causation. BN enables both inductive and abductive reasoning, which helps to 
better understand and minimize model uncertainty. In this work, the methodology is 
proposed to integrate BN with HBA to model rare events, considering both data and model 
uncertainty. HBA considers data uncertainty, while BN uses an adaptive model to better 
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represent and manage model uncertainty. Application of the proposed methodology is 
demonstrated using three types of offshore accidents. The proposed methodology 
provides a way to develop a dynamic risk analysis approach to rare events. 
 
Keywords: Data uncertainty; Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis; Model uncertainty; 
Bayesian Network; Risk analysis of major accidents.  
4.1 Introduction 
The prediction of rare events with severe consequences is an important task and a very 
complicated mission. Major accidents, which are infrequent events, have a significant 
impact on humans, the environment, and assets. Therefore, to predict and update the 
probability of such accidents and to take actions to prevent them, it is very important to 
widen the risk analysis scope by considering accident scenarios and real-time safety 
analysis [1]. In real world industry, the information is usually insufficient (i.e., scarce, 
missing) to perform such an analysis. Many attempts have been made in the context of 
rare events probability estimation. Very efficient sampling algorithms have been proposed 
to estimate rare event probabilities, such as Importance Sampling or Importance Splitting, 
as well as a joint use of Monte-Carlo simulations and surrogate models [2-5]. In addition, 
gathering data from different sources is one of the solutions that has been effectively used 
to overcome the data scarcity problem, yet a special technique must be used in the 
estimation process to address the uncertainty in the aggregated data. The Hieratical 
Bayesian approach has been effectively used to address source-to-source variability [6-
9]. In addition, precursor-based risk analysis has been used in major accident risk 
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analysis to overcome the data scarcity problem. In [10-13] Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis 
was used to implement the application of precursor data analysis. In these studies, the 
precursor data were collected from different regions. Similarly, the regional data were 
collected during different wells activities and for different wells’ types [10]. Thus, the 
contributing events of the accident and the relevant safety barriers vary in each situation, 
which means that the collected data may not really reflect the inherent mechanism of the 
accident.  
 
As a major accident is decomposed into its contributing events, the probability of an 
accident is usually obtained by incorporating those events’ probability via event tree (ET) 
or fault tree (FT) analysis. These are the most popular probabilistic modeling techniques 
used in risk analysis. The contributing events’ probabilities are derived using historical 
data which are usually aggregated from sources of different locative and operational 
characteristics. This would associate the analysis with a degree of uncertainty known as 
a source to source variability [10,14]. Even though they have some limitations, FT and ET 
techniques have been extensively used in the field of risk analysis [1]. As they are known 
to have a static structure, they are unable to capture the variation of risks as changes in 
the system take place [15,16]. A bowtie (BT) is one of the popular tools used in several 
safety and risk frameworks due to its ability to integrate all the root causes, consequences 
and relative safety barriers of an accident scenario in one model [17]. However, BT suffers 
the same limitations as do FT and ET, as it is a combination of fault and event trees. 
These limitations introduce uncertainty in the results, which can be considered as model 
uncertainty. Consequently, there is a need to develop more dynamic risk analysis models. 
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Dynamic risk assessment methods are able to re-evaluate the risk by updating initial 
failure probabilities of events as new information becomes available, during any stage of 
the operation [16]. BN is one of the ways that has been used in reconsidering prior failure 
probabilities. The new data in the form of likelihood functions are used with Bayes’ 
theorem to update the priors. BNs are used as a dynamic tool instead of the conventional 
static risk analysis models. Studies in Refs. [1] and [18-20] were attempts to map FT into 
BN. Others [21,22] tried to convert ET into BN, and in Ref. [23] a BT model was mapped 
into BN. BN can be used in both ways: i) to represent causation, dependency, and 
occurrence to estimate accident probability, in addition to the possibility of including 
evidence at any stage of the BN; ii) given the occurrence of an accident or event, it 
explains the most probable causes or causal pathways. 
 
This paper aims to provide BN along with HBA in one framework for major accidents 
prediction. This framework considers both data uncertainty and model uncertainty. 
Modeling HBA with BN, HBA considers data uncertainty and BN uses adaptive models to 
address model uncertainty. Section 2 presents a detailed discussion on data uncertainty 
and the application of HBA in treating data uncertainty. Section 3 discusses model 
uncertainty, introducing Bayesian networks and their advantages over traditional 
techniques. Section 4 provides detailed descriptions of the proposed methodology. 
Section 5 demonstrates the application of the methodology using three different case 
studies from previous major accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry (i.e., ship-
iceberg collision, platform grounding and finally, fire and explosion). Section 6 concludes 
the paper.                  
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4.2  Data Uncertainty 
In the field of reliability and safety analysis, the information available is usually insufficient 
to perform the analysis, especially for the prediction of major accidents that involve 
significant consequences. Therefore, in order to get the best possible results and to 
support decision-making, there is a need to aggregate the relevant data from different 
regions, operational conditions and sometimes different sectors (e.g., chemical, nuclear 
or mining). HBA is a robust technique for the estimation process to treat source-to-source 
uncertainty among these data. It can be used to derive the probabilities of events 
contributing to an accident by modeling the aggregated failure /occurrence data for each 
event using a specific distribution with a parameter of interest (i.e., probability or failure 
rate). Then it provides a posterior predictive distribution for this parameter. This posterior 
distribution reflects the uncertainty among the data aggregated from different sources. 
The mean value of this distribution represents the appropriate value for the parameter of 
interest. In addition, this distribution can be used as an informative prior distribution when 
more case-specific data become available in order to update the probability. 
4.2.1 Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis 
HBA is one of the useful techniques in probabilistic risk analysis for cases with scarce 
data. HBA has the ability to incorporate a wide range of information in the estimation 
process, considering source-to-source variability in the aggregated dataset [6,10,24]. The 
debatable part of any Bayesian method is developing an appropriate prior distribution. In 
the past, the two-stage Bayesian and empirical Bayes theorems were commonly used in 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for developing priors. A multistage prior distribution 
is utilized in the hierarchical model, which is very complex to analyze numerically. 
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Recently, the availability of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based sampling software 
makes a fully hierarchical Bayes analysis tractable [7,9]. As data scarcity is a very 
common problem in PRA, in such cases there is a need to aggregate the data sets from 
a variety of sources. In the first step of HBA, a likelihood function with a parameter of 
interest ϕ will be specified for the data set (𝑦). Then an informative prior distribution can 
be developed for this parameter by considering that the parameter ϕ follows a generic 
distribution ϕ~ω0(ϕ|α, β) which represents the first stage prior. The hyper-parameters 
(α, β)  that characterize this prior are also uncertain and are considered to follow a 
diffusive or non-informative distribution 𝑔0(α, β), which is known as a second stage prior 
or hyper prior distribution [6].  
 
The data set (𝑦) along with Bayes theorem can be used to update the second stage prior 
in order to have a posterior distribution for α and β, i.e., 𝑔1(α, β|y). It is calculated using 
the two-dimensional form of Bayes theorem: 
 
𝑔1(α, β|y) =
𝑔0(α, β)  𝐿(𝑦|α, β)
∬ 𝑔0(α, β)  𝐿(𝑦|α, β)𝑑𝛼 𝑑𝛽
                                                                                     (4 − 1) 
 
 
where the likelihood function of α and β, i.e., 𝐿(𝑦|α, β), is achieved by averaging the 
likelihood function of ϕ, i.e., 𝐿(𝑦|ϕ) over all values of ϕ: 
 
𝐿(𝑦|α, β) =  ∫ 𝐿(𝑦|ϕ) ω0(ϕ|α, β)𝑑ϕ                                                                                            (4 − 2) 
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The posterior distribution of the hyper-parameters (α, β), i.e., 𝑔1(α, β|y) will be used to 
update the first stage prior ω0(ϕ|α, β) to obtain the posterior predictive 
distribution ω1(ϕ|y). This distribution is known as the population variability curve (PVC) 
and can be written as [6,9,13]: 
 
ω1(ϕ|y) =  ∬ ω0(ϕ|α, β) 𝑔1(α, β|y) 𝑑α dβ                                                                                  (4 − 3)           
 
This distribution represents the source–to-source uncertainty in ϕ and can be used as an 
informative prior distribution when more case-specific data become available: 
 
ω1(ϕ|𝑦
∗, y) =
ω1(ϕ|y) 𝐿(y
∗|ϕ)
∫ ω1(ϕ|y) 𝐿(y
∗|ϕ)dϕ
                                                                                            (4 − 4) 
   
 
ω1(ϕ|𝑦
∗, y)  ∝  ω1(ϕ|y)𝐿(y
∗|ϕ)                                                                                                     (4 − 5)  
 
 
4.2.2 Inference algorithms 
In probabilistic risk analysis, an estimate of a component’s failure rate or failure probability 
is required. Such data are not always readily available. Therefore, PRA must use the 
available data and information as efficiently as possible [25]. Bayesian inference uses the 
available data to provide a distribution representing what is known about the element; this 
distribution is called the informative prior [9]. In Bayesian statistics, all the unknown 
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parameters are considered as random variables. For this reason, the prior distribution 
must be defined initially [6]. Specification of the prior distribution is important in Bayesian 
inference since it influences the posterior inference [7]. In the present study, an inference 
using conjugate prior distributions is used. These prior distributions have the useful 
property of resulting in posteriors of the same distributional family. Based on the type of 
the collected data, the distributional family is selected, where a likelihood function and its 
conjugate prior distribution can be specified to represent the data. For example: 
If there is a set of discrete count data, which represents the number of failures 𝑦 in 
exposure time 𝑡, then a Poisson likelihood function can be used to describe the data set 
with a parameter of interest , which represents the failure rate.  
𝐿(𝑦|λ) =
(𝜆𝑡)𝑦𝑒−𝜆𝑡
𝑦!
,          𝑦 = 0,1, ….                                                                                           (4 − 6) 
As a result, a gamma prior distribution for  with parameters (𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽) is considered. 
Thus, in the Hierarchal Bayesian approach, the first stage prior for  denoted by 
ω0(ϕ|α, β) will be: 
ω0(λ|α, β) =
𝛽𝛼𝜆𝛼−1𝑒−𝛽𝜆
Γ(𝛼)
                                                                                                                (4 − 7) 
 
However, if there is a set of data expresses the number of successes 𝑦 over 𝑛 attempts, 
then a binomial likelihood function can be used to describe the data set with parameter 
of interest 𝑝, which represents the probability of success. 
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𝐿(𝑦|𝑝) = (
𝑛
𝑦
) 𝑝𝑦(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑦,     0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑛                                                                                   (4 − 8) 
 
 
As conjugate priors are used, a beta prior distribution for 𝑝 with parameters (𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏) is 
considered. Thus in the Hierarchal Bayesian analysis, the first stage prior for 𝑝 denoted 
by ω0(ϕ|α, β) will be: 
 
ω0(𝑝|𝑎, 𝑏) =
𝛤(𝑎 + 𝑏)
𝛤(𝑎)𝛤(𝑏)
𝑝𝑎−1(1 − 𝑝)𝑏−1                                                                                       (4 − 9) 
 
Regarding the second stage prior 𝑔0(α, β) , usually diffusive or non-informative prior 
distributions are used in HBA for the hyper-parameters (𝛼, 𝛽)  or (𝑎, 𝑏), as a prior 
distribution that will not influence the posterior distribution must be specified. Such priors 
originated in a continuing quest to find a mathematical representation of complete 
uncertainty, and they are frequently called non-informative or vague prior distributions [9]. 
4.2.3 Illustrative Example for Uncertainty Treatment Using HBA 
 Assume that failure data collected for a certain device in the system are from 10 different 
sources. The failure data are represented as the number of failures (𝑦𝑖) in a specific 
number of demands (𝑁𝑖) as shown in Table 4.1. It is desirable to find one value out of 
these 10 to represent the failure probability of this device. In such cases the, average 
(i.e., traditional method) is usually used as the best estimator to represent the failure 
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probability of this device. In fact, this method may lead to significant variations in the 
results. HBA based on these data is able to provide a distribution for the failure probability. 
The mean of this distribution is the most appropriate value to represent the failure 
probability of this device. 
 
Table 4.1. Failure data collected from 10 sources [6] 
 
Source Number of 
failures (𝒚𝒊) 
Number of 
Trials (𝑵𝒊) 
1 0 140 
2 0 130 
3 0 130 
4 1 130 
5 2 100 
6 3 185 
7 3 175 
8 4 167 
9 5 151 
10 10 150 
 
 
The number of failures ( 𝑦𝑖)  can be modeled using binomial likelihood 𝐿(𝑦|𝑝)  with 
parameter of interest 𝑝 . This parameter is unknown and is assumed to follow beta 
distribution ω0(𝑝|𝑎, 𝑏), with hyper parameters 𝑎, 𝑏, as it is the conjugate prior for the 
binomial likelihood. An independent diffusive distribution 𝑔0(𝑎, 𝑏) is assumed for 𝑎, 𝑏. The 
posterior predictive distribution of 𝑝 , representing source to source uncertainty 
ω1(𝑝|𝑦), can be generated by sampling the hyper parameters 𝑎, 𝑏 from their joint posterior 
distribution 𝑔1(𝑎, 𝑏|𝑦) and then by sampling the posterior predictive distribution from the 
first stage prior beta distribution as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖 ~ 𝑏𝑖𝑛 (𝑝𝑖, 𝑛𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖~ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 (𝑎, 𝑏) 
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𝑎~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001) 
𝑏~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001) 
 
This model is coded in OpenBUGS; a Markov Chain Monte Carlo software tool [9,24,25]. 
The OpenBUGS script used to analyze this problem is provided in Table 4.2. A posterior 
distribution for the probability of failure is obtained as shown in Figure 4.1, with a mean 
value that represents the appropriate value for the component failure probability, in 
addition to the 90% or 95% credible intervals. 
 
 
Table 4.2. OpenBUGS script for analyzing the failure probability 
𝐦𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 { 
# 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐛𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 
𝐟𝐨𝐫 (𝐢 𝐢𝐧 𝟏 ∶  𝟏𝟎) { 
                𝐲[𝐢] ~𝐝𝐛𝐢𝐧(𝐩[𝐢], 𝐧[𝐢])  # 𝐥𝐢𝐤𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐡𝐨𝐨𝐝 
                𝐩[𝐢] ~ 𝐝𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐚(𝐚, 𝐛)  # 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫 
                } 
𝐩. 𝐚𝐯𝐠 ~ 𝐝𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐚(𝐚, 𝐛)  #𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐩 
𝐛~𝐝𝐠𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐚(𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏, 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏)  # 𝐡𝐲𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫 
𝐚~𝐝𝐠𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐚(𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏, 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏)  # 𝐡𝐲𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫  
} 
𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐚    #𝐨𝐛𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐞𝐝 𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐚 
𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐭(𝐲 = 𝐜(𝟎, 𝟎, 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐, 𝟑, 𝟑, 𝟒, 𝟓, 𝟏𝟎), 
 𝐧 = 𝐜(𝟏𝟒𝟎, 𝟏𝟑𝟎, 𝟏𝟑𝟎, 𝟏𝟑𝟎, 𝟏𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝟖𝟓, 𝟏𝟕𝟓, 𝟏𝟔𝟕, 𝟏𝟓𝟏, 𝟏𝟓𝟎)    
𝐍 = 𝟏𝟎) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Predictive posterior distribution for the probability of failure 
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Assuming that a new data point becomes available (e.g., 𝑦 =7 failures on 𝑛= 125 trails), 
the probability of failure can be updated. This posterior predictive distribution can be 
considered as an informative prior distribution for the parameter of interest 𝑝 (probability 
of failure). As the informative distribution is beta conjugate prior, the updated distribution 
will be beta distribution with a mean of (𝑎𝑚 + 𝑦)/(𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 + 𝑛), where 𝑎𝑚 and 𝑏𝑚 are the 
mean value of the joint posterior distributions of 𝑎, 𝑏. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Comparison results for the probability of failure 
Sample 
size 
Traditional 
method 
      
HBA 
Relative 
difference  
10 data 
point 
 
New 
data 
0.018478 
 
 
0.021889 
0.02085 
 
 
0.02645 
12.8% 
 
 
20.8% 
 
The relative difference is used as a measure to compare the two methods. The results in 
Table 4.3 show that the probability obtained using HBA is 12.8% higher than the one 
obtained using the average. When a new data point becomes available, the posterior 
predictive distribution obtained by HBA is used as an informative prior distribution to 
update the probability. The updated probability was 20% higher than the value obtained 
by re-averaging the data set. Therefore, if the average is used as an estimator to 
represent the failure probability of this device, it would result in a significant variation in 
the final results.   
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4.3  Model Uncertainty 
In any industrial field, it is imperative to keep the risk within the acceptable level. 
Implementing safety measures, escorted by a broadened risk assessment, is pivotal to 
prevent the occurrence of undesired events. Among several risk assessment 
methodologies such as quantitative risk analysis (QRA), probabilistic safety analysis 
(PSA) and optimal risk analysis (ORA), accident scenario analysis is a common task [17]. 
The fault tree, event tree, and bowtie are the most popular techniques used for accident 
scenario analysis.  
 
FT is a graphical deductive model used to identify and determine the potential causes of 
an undesired event, denoted as the top event [26]. The tree has a converging structure, 
in which the primary events (i.e., causes) are linked to the top event using logical gates. 
AND-gates and OR-gates are the most commonly used gates. FTs are not appropriate to 
analyze large systems, especially if the system presents redundant, common cause 
failures [1]. ET is an inductive model that has a diverging structure. This model identifies 
the possible outcomes of an initiating event occurrence followed by multiple failures of 
the safety barriers in the system [27]. FTs and ETs are known to be static; they are not 
able to use real-time information to update prior beliefs of primary events and safety 
barriers [1,17,18]. In addition, events in the FT and ET are assumed to be statistically 
independent, which is not usually a valid assumption [18]. BT is one of the best graphical 
techniques; it provides a complete qualitative and quantitative representation of the 
accident scenario beginning from root causes and ending with its consequences [17]. 
However, BT cannot be considered as a dynamic perspective because it suffers from the 
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same limitation of the above-mentioned tools, as bowtie is composed of fault and event 
trees [23]. These limitations introduce uncertainty in the models’ results, called model 
uncertainty. 
 
As a result, there is a need to develop dynamic risk analysis models, in order to be able 
to re-evaluate the risk by updating initial failure probabilities of events as new information 
becomes available during system operation [16]. The Bayesian Network (BN) is one of 
the ways that has been used in reconsidering prior failure probabilities, where the new 
data in the form of likelihood functions are used with Bayes’ theorem to update the priors. 
BNs are able to represent causal relationships among a set of random variables 
considering local dependencies [28]. 
 
4.3.1 Bayesian Network 
BN is a probabilistic inference tool that is used in the field of risk analysis and safety 
assessment for reasoning under uncertainty [29]. BN is a graphical technique consisting 
of nodes that characterize variables. These nodes are connected to each other by arcs 
that represent relations among the nodes and the strength of these relations specified by 
the conditional probability tables (CPTs) [1,30], Figure 4.2 presents a typical Bayesian 
network. BN is superior to the conventional techniques due to its ability to model multi-
state variables, common failure causes, and conditional dependencies, in addition to its 
probability updating ability given an evidence occurrence [1,15,17,23].  
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Figure 4.2. Simple example of Bayesian network with four nodes [31] 
  
The quantitative analysis performed by BN is based on the “d-separation” norm [28] and 
the chain rule [1]. Considering the conditional dependencies of variables, BN represents 
the joint probability distribution 𝑃(𝑈) of variables 𝑈 =  {𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴𝑛}, as:  
 
𝑃(𝑈) =  ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖))                                                                                                           (4 − 10)
𝑛
𝑖=1                 
 
 
where 𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖)  are the parents of variable (𝐴𝑖)  in the network, and 𝑃(𝑈)  reflects the 
properties of the BN [1,28,29]. Probability updating is the superior feature of BN [1]. Given 
new information (denoted as 𝐸), BN is able to update the prior beliefs of variables using 
Bayes’ theorem. The resulting posterior is written as: 
 
𝑃(𝑈|𝐸) =  
P(𝑈, 𝐸)
P(𝐸)
=  
P(𝑈, 𝐸)
∑ 𝑃(𝑈, 𝐸)𝑈
                                                                                                (4 − 11) 
 
Equation (4 –11) can be used for forward or backward analysis. In other words, it can be 
used to predict an unknown variable (inductive manner) or to update a known variable 
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given the occurrence of evidence (abductive manner). In the inductive analysis, the 
probability of an accident given the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a certain primary 
event is calculated, represented by the conditional probability form of 𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡), 
while in the abductive analysis, the probability of a certain event is estimated given the 
accident occurrence, using the conditional probability form of 𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) [32]. 
 
4.4   Methodology 
Early prediction is very important to improve safety systems in order to prevent the 
occurrence of rare accidents, which is a challenging task in probabilistic risk analysis due 
to a dearth of information. The probability of an accident can be estimated using one of 
the modeling techniques such as ET or FT. These conventional techniques have some 
limitations, which introduce a degree of uncertainty in their results. The proposed 
methodology considers both data uncertainty and model uncertainty by modeling HBA 
with BN: HBA considers data uncertainty and BN uses adaptive models to handle model 
uncertainty. Figure 4.3 presents the methodology framework. The main methodology 
stages are described in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4. 
 
4.4.1 Stage 1: Mapping Fault Tree, Event Tree or Bowtie into BN 
After identifying the hazards, an accident scenario can be defined using one of the 
modeling tools (e.g., Event Tree, Fault Tree or Bowtie). Constructing ETs or FTs is the 
first step in the modeling process of an accident. These techniques are effectively used 
to identify all the possible root causes, consequences and relative safety barriers of an 
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accident scenario. Due to their static structures, they are unable to capture the variation 
of risks as changes in the system take place. In addition, events are assumed to be 
statistically independent, which is not usually a valid assumption and introduces 
uncertainty in the final results. All those limitations can be relaxed to a sufficient level by 
mapping the conventional technique into BN.  
 
The FT can be mapped into BN. The basic events, intermediate events and top event of 
the FT are converted to root nodes, intermediate nodes, and a leaf node, respectively. 
The nodes of BN are connected in the same way as the equivalent events in the FT. 
Numerically, basic event probabilities are assigned as prior probabilities to the 
corresponding root nodes. Conditional probability tables (CPTs) are assigned to each 
intermediate node as well as for the leaf node. CPTs illustrate how nodes are related to 
each other [17,18].  
 
ET can be converted to BN. The initial event and each safety barrier in ET are converted 
to corresponding nodes in BN, and all branches are converted to connecting arcs in BN, 
showing the relationship between nodes. Branching conditions in ET are represented by 
node states in CPT. The consequences are represented with only one node in BN, which 
has the same number of states as the number of consequences in the ET.  The 
probabilities of an initial event and safety barriers are considered as the prior probabilities 
for the corresponding nodes in the BN. Furthermore, CPTs are assigned for each node 
in the BN [21,22]. As the Bowtie is composed of Fault and Event trees, after developing 
the equivalent BNs of the FT and ET, they are connected to each other through the top 
event as a central node. Also, to take into account the effect of the nonoccurrence of the 
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top event on the consequence node, the top event node must be connected to the 
consequence node. Another state must be added to the consequence node states to 
indicate the non-occurrence of the top event [17].  
 
4.4.2 Stage 2: Data Collection 
Failure or event occurrence data for each node will be collected from different sources 
such as different regions, operational conditions, and sometimes different sectors (e.g., 
chemical, nuclear or mining) or from different experts in the case of using experts’ 
judgment. Experts’ judgment can be a very helpful source of data for newly designed 
installations or processes for which no experimental observations are possible [33]. 
   
4.4.3 Stage 3: Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis for Treating Data Uncertainty 
HBA is used to derive the probability for each event’s node. (This step was clearly 
described in the illustrative example in section 4.2.3). Data relevant to each node are 
collected from various sources. Based on the type of the aggregated data, a likelihood 
function is specified for each data set. For instance, if the number of failures is collected 
in a certain period of time, a Poisson likelihood function can be used to model the data 
set. Then the hierarchical model will be written as: 
 
𝑥𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛 (𝜆𝑖, 𝑡𝑖)                    likelihood function 
𝜆𝑖 ~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝛼, 𝛽)                      first stage conjugate prior 
𝛼~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)   diffusive hyper prior  
𝛽~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)  diffusive hyper prior 
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If the time at which a random event occurs (i.e., time to failure) is observed, then an 
exponential likelihood function can be used to model the data set and the hierarchical 
model will be written as: 
 
𝑡𝑖 ~ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝜆𝑖)                   likelihood function  
𝜆 𝑖~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝛼, 𝛽)                      first stage conjugate prior     
𝛼~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)   diffusive hyper prior  
𝛽~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)   diffusive hyper prior   
 
 
HBA provides a posterior distribution for the parameter of interest (i.e. probability or failure 
rate) with mean and credible intervals. The mean value represents the most appropriate 
value for the parameter of interest. This distribution represents the source–to-source 
uncertainty in the parameter and can be used as an informative prior distribution when 
more case-specific data become available. 
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Figure 4.3. Proposed methodology framework 
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4.4.4 Stage 4: Bayesian Network Analysis for Accident Prediction and Updating 
After obtaining all event probabilities, in this stage, BN will be used for two purposes. First, 
the events’ probability will be used as a prior belief to predict the probability of an accident. 
Second, the events’ probability will be updated given the accident occurrence through the 
process of probability propagation or reasoning. In addition, BN has the possibility of 
including new evidence in the system at any stage. Once new data for a certain node 
become available, the node probability can be updated. First, the posterior distribution 
obtained from HBA will be considered as an informative prior probability distribution. This 
informative prior distribution can be used to update the node probability. Once the node 
is updated, BN will update the whole model using the probability reasoning process.     
 
4.5  Application 
The application of the proposed methodology is demonstrated using the following three 
cases of major accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
4.5.1 First case: Ship-iceberg Collision 
Recently, human activities in the Arctic region have increased rapidly due to exploration 
and development of oil and gas there. Ship-iceberg collision is one of the common 
accidents that might increase due to increasing human activities in this harsh environment 
[34]. Therefore, developing shipping safety plans and implementing more risk analysis is 
required for scenarios for which no historical data is available in this harsh area. This 
study attempts to address this issue by applying the proposed methodology described in 
section 4. The following FT in Figure 4.4 represents the possible causes that can lead to 
ship-iceberg collision [35-38]. The causes of ship-iceberg collision as a potential accident 
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in a marine environment are more complex and the FT in Figure 4.4 is developed only to 
illustrate the application of the proposed methodology. 
 
Figure 4.4. Fault tree for ship-iceberg collision 
 
To overcome the limitation of its static structure, FT was mapped to BN as shown in 
Figure 4.5, assuming that the annual number of occurrences on demand for each root 
node was collected from different sources, as shown in Table 4.4. The number of 
demands represents the annual number of times an iceberg is present in the fairway. 
 
Collision  
Iceberg detection 
failure    
Maneuvering error   
Uncontrolled 
situation   
Equipment 
failure  
Rough 
weather  
Steering 
failure  
Propulsion 
system 
failure  
Operator 
failure  
Automatic 
system 
failure  
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Figure 4.5. BN for ship-iceberg collision 
 
 
Table 4.4. Basic events failure data from different sources 
 
Sources 
 
Demands 
     Ni [15]  
 
Operator 
failure 
 
Automatic 
system 
failure 
 
Propulsion 
failure 
 
Steering 
failure 
 
Equipment 
failure 
 
Rough 
weather 
1 10 1 0 1 1 1 8 
2 15 2 1 0 2 0 11 
3 23 2 2 2 2 3 20 
4 26 3 2 3 3 2 15 
5 38 5 1 4 4 5 17 
6 31 4 2 2 2 4 30 
7 25 3 0 1 2 1 22 
8 28 4 1 3 1 2 17 
9 37 4 2 4 5 4 30 
10 47 6 3 5 4 5 35 
 
Treating the data given in Table 4.4 with HBA as described in Section 4.3 will provide an 
occurrence probability distribution (i.e., predictive posterior distribution for each node) as 
shown in Figure 4.6. The mean value of this distribution represents the appropriate value 
for the probability of failure/occurrence of the node (column 1 in Table 4.5). After obtaining 
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the probability of occurrence for the root node, it will be used as a prior belief in BN to 
predict the probability of an accident, as shown in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
  
Figure 4.6. Posterior predictive distributions for the basic events 
 
The collision probability obtained from the previous analysis can be used to predict the 
expected number of collisions in the next time interval. For instance, if 50 icebergs are 
expected in the fairway in the next time interval, then the number of expected collisions 
can be estimated using the form 𝑌𝑖 = (𝑁𝑖 × 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦). Considering 𝑁𝑖 = 50, 
12 collisions are expected in the next time interval. In addition, the occurrence probability 
of the root nodes can be updated given the occurrence of an accident. This is known as 
abductive reasoning, which is one of BN’s advantages over FTs. As shown in Table 4.5 
(column 2), the occurrence probability of the root nodes is updated given the probability 
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of having a collision equal to 1. In fact, abductive reasoning is very helpful to identify the 
critical events, which make the most contribution to the accident occurrence. Also, it helps 
to detect the combination of non-critical events (i.e., weak links) that may lead to an 
accident. It is clear from Figure 4.8 that when abductive reasoning was performed, the 
rough weather event contributed the most to the accident occurrence. At the same time, 
the combination of propulsion system failure and steering failure contributes significantly 
to the accident.   
 
  
 
Figure 4.7. BN for ship-iceberg collision 
  
 
Once new data become available, the occurrence probability for a certain node can be 
updated. The posterior probability distribution obtained from HBA will be considered as 
an informative prior distribution for the parameter of interest 𝑃  (i.e., probability of 
occurrence). Assume that a new data point is available (in the form of the number of 
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occurrences 𝑦 on demand 𝑛) for a propulsion system failure event. From the previous 
HBA, as the informative distribution was beta conjugate prior, the updated distribution will 
be beta distribution with a mean of (𝑎𝑚 + 𝑦)/(𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 + 𝑛), where 𝑎𝑚 and 𝑏𝑚 are the 
mean value of a, b hyper parameters obtained from their joint posterior distribution 
generated by 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑆. The mean value of the updated distribution, which is 0.08722, 
represents the updated probability for a propulsion system failure node. By using this 
updated node in the previous BN, the prior probability for the leaf node is calculated to be 
0.2360. Hence, an abductive reasoning was performed given the accident occurrence, 
yielding the updated nodes probabilities in Table 4.5 (column 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Abductive reasoning for ship-iceberg collision 
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Table 4.5. Comparison of prior and posterior nodes’ probabilities in different modeling steps 
 First modeling Modeling with new data 
for one node 
Modeling with new data 
for all nodes 
 
Node 
 
Prior  
 
Posterior  
 
Prior 
 
 
Posterior  
 
Prior  
 
Posterior  
Operator 
failure 
0.1236 0.1416 0.1236 0.1418 0.1244 0.1422 
Automatic 
system failure 
0.0516 0.0712 0.0516 0.0714 0.0547 0.0740 
Propulsion 
system failure 
0.0897 0.3768 0.0872 0.3695 0.0872 0.3474 
Steering failure 
 
0.0934 0.3925 0.0934 0.3960 0.0920 0.3667 
Equipment 
failure 
0.0965 0.3166 0.0965 0.3192 0.0970 0.3636 
Rough weather 0.7331 0.7981 0.7331 0.7988 0.9284 0.9495 
Collision 
 
0.2380 
 
1.0000 0.2360 1.0000 0.2509 1.0000 
 
 
Considering that there were new data (in the form of the number of occurrences 𝑦 on 
demand 𝑛) available for all the nodes, the occurrence probability for each node could be 
updated. The posterior probability distribution obtained for each node from the HBA is 
considered as an informative prior distribution for the parameter of interest P (i.e., 
probability of occurrence). As this informative distribution was beta conjugate prior, the 
updated distribution will be a beta distribution with a mean of (𝑎𝑚 + 𝑦)/(𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 +
𝑛). 𝑎𝑚, 𝑏𝑚 are the mean values of a, b hyper parameters and are obtained from their joint 
posterior distribution. The mean value of the updated distribution for each node 
represents the updated probability, which will be used in BN as a prior probability as 
shown in Table 4.5 (column 5). The prior probability for the leaf node is calculated to be 
0.2509. Additionally, an abductive reasoning was performed given the accident 
occurrence yielding the updated nodes probabilities in column 6. 
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4.5.2 Second case: platform grounding
Moving a rig from one location to another in the sea has many hazards; it is a very risky 
mission. Many factors can make a tow mission dangerous, such as human error, rough 
weather, loss of tow line and tow vessel engine failure. These factors may also lead to a 
total loss of the rig. When a tow mission takes place in rough weather, several 
consequences may ensue. Based on the understood of the historical incidents cases in 
the Refs. [39,40] of grounded platforms, the ET shown in Figure 4.9 is constructed. It 
represents the possible consequences that might occur when there is a tow mission in 
poor weather followed by multi safety barrier failures. A BN is constructed for the accident 
scenario, where the ET is converted to BN as shown in Figure 4.10. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.9. Event tree for grounding during tow mission 
 
Data provided in Table 4.6 are experts’ opinions data. The number of occurrences for the 
initial event and for each safety barrier was modeled hierarchically to obtain the posterior 
    
Severe weather 
 during tow mission 
 
Tow equipment  
      inspection  
	
Tow vessels  
redundancy  
Platform stability 
 
Evacuation and  
emergency  
response   
 
Consequences   
	
Safe		
Yes		
No		
Near miss/control 
 loss is avoided   
Loss of directional  
control/deck flooding   
Platform fluctuate 
/injuries   
Grounding/ capsize 
/fatalities   
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predictive distribution for the probability of occurrence as shown in Figure 4.11. These will 
be used as informative priors once new data become available, in order to update the 
probabilities. The first column in Table 4.7 provides the mean values for those posterior 
distributions which represent the occurrence probabilities. These probabilities will be used 
as a prior belief in BN to predict the consequence probabilities as shown in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.10. BN for platform grounding 
 
 
Table 4.6. Initial event and safety barriers data from different sources 
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Figure 4.11. Posterior predictive distributions for the initial event and safety barriers 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. BN for platform grounding 
 
By performing abductive reasoning, the occurrence probability of the initial event and 
safety barriers is updated as shown in Table 4.7 (column 2). In addition, the critical events 
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are identified as well as the weak links that contribute to the accident occurrence. As 
shown in Figure 4.13, rough weather and platform instability are the main events that 
contribute to accident occurrence.    
 
 
Figure 4.13. Abductive reasoning for platform grounding 
 
 
Table 4.7. Comparison between prior and posterior nodes’ probabilities in different modeling steps 
 First modeling Modeling with new data for all nodes 
 
Prior  
 
Posterior  
 
Prior  
 
Posterior  
Severe weather during 
tow mission 
0.6894 0.7329 0.6955 0.7522 
Tow equipment 
inspection 
0.3045 0.4020 0.2993 0.3403 
Tow vessel redundancy  0.2873 0.3241 0.3133 0.3557 
 
Platform Stability  0.1490 0.1701 0.1603 0.1846 
 
Evacuation and 
emergency response  
0.6771 0.7297 0.6644 0.7222 
Safe 0.2070 0.0000 0.2046 0.0000 
 
Near miss/control loss 
is avoided  
0.1377 0.0000 0.1526 0.0000 
Loss of directional 
control/deck flooding  
0.05381 0.0000 0.05715 0.0000 
Platform 
fluctuate/injuries  
0.1969 0.0000 0.1867 0.0000 
Grounding/ 
capsize/fatalities  
0.0939 1.0000 0.0943 1.0000 
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Once new data become available for any node, the occurrence probability for the node 
can be updated by using the informative prior distribution obtained from HBA. The mean 
value of the updated distribution for each node represents the updated node probability, 
which will be used in BN as a prior probability as shown in Table 4.7 (Column 3). 
Subsequently, an abductive reasoning was performed given the accident occurrence, 
yielding the updated nodes probabilities in column 4. 
 
 
4.5.3 Third case: Fire and explosion 
Fires and explosions are the most significant causes of harm and damage to equipment. 
Especially in the offshore oil and gas sector, such disasters threaten human lives and 
might be very costly as there is a high concentration of equipment in a very close space 
[41]. For instance, the Piper Alpha disaster that killed 167 workers on 6 July 1988 off the 
coast of Aberdeen is deemed the world's deadliest rig accident [42]. As a result of a 
preventive maintenance procedure, condensate gas leaked out and ignited while firewalls 
that would have resisted fire failed to cope with the ensuing gas explosion. The following 
BT in Figure 4.14 illustrates the common root causes and possible accident scenario that 
can lead to such fire and explosion accidents. It has a simple structure to demonstrate 
the application of the proposed methodology. To overcome its limitation, BT is mapped 
into BN as shown in Figure 4.15. 
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Figure 4.14. Bowtie modeling for platform fire and explosion 
 
 
Figure 4.15. BN for platform fire and explosion 
 
To demonstrate the methodology,10 data points for the number of occurrences of each 
root node in a certain operation time are assumed, as shown in Table 4.8. In addition, the 
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number of successes for each safety barrier node out of the number of leaks Ni was 
assumed. 
 
Table 4.8. The number of occurrence of root nodes, safety barriers nodes 
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The number of occurrences for each root node 𝑥𝑖 was modeled using Poisson distribution 
with a parameter of interest 𝜆. The parameter 𝜆 is unknown and is assumed to follow the 
conjugate prior gamma distribution with hyperparameters α, β. An independent diffusive 
distribution is assumed for α, β. As a result, a posterior predictive distribution was 
generated for the occurrence rate for each root node as shown in Figure 4.16.  
 
𝑥𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛 (𝜆𝑖, 𝑡𝑖)                      likelihood function 
𝜆 𝑖~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (𝛼, 𝛽)                        first stage conjugate prior 
𝛼~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)     diffusive hyper prior 
𝛽~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)     diffusive hyper prior 
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Figure 4.16. Posterior predictive distributions for the basic events 
 
The mean value of the posterior predictive distribution represents the most appropriate 
value of the occurrence rate 𝜆 for the root node. Additionally, the number of successes 
for each safety barrier 𝑦𝑖, is modeled using binomial distribution with parameter of interest 
𝑝, where 𝑝 is an unknown parameter and is assumed to follow the conjugate prior beta 
distribution with hyper parameters 𝑎, 𝑏 . Also, an independent diffusive distribution is 
assumed for 𝑎, 𝑏. 
𝑦𝑖 ~ 𝑏𝑖𝑛 (𝑝𝑖, 𝑛𝑖)                                 likelihood function 
𝑝𝑖~ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 (𝑎, 𝑏)                                  first stage conjugate prior 
𝑎~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)       diffusive hyper prior 
𝑏~ 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 (0.0001, 0.0001)       diffusive hyper prior 
 
Figure 4.17 represents the posterior predictive distribution generated for each safety 
barrier occurrence probability. The mean value of the posterior predictive distribution 
represents the precise value of the safety barrier occurrence probability. These 
84 
 
 
probabilities will be used as a prior belief in BN to predict the pivotal node and 
consequence probabilities as shown in Figure 4.18. 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Posterior predictive distribution for the safety barriers’ occurrence probabilities 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18. BN for platform fire and explosion 
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By performing abductive reasoning, the occurrence probability for all the nodes is updated 
as shown in Table 4.9 (column 2). In addition, it is easy to identify the critical events and 
weak links that contribute to the accident occurrence, as shown in Figure 4.19, which 
helps to develop the preventative safety barriers in the system.    
 
 
 
Figure 4.19. Abductive reasoning for platform fire and explosion 
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Table 4.9. Comparison of prior and posterior nodes’ probabilities in different modeling steps 
 First modeling Modeling with new data for all nodes 
 
Prior  
 
Posterior  
 
Prior  
 
Posterior  
Poor blanking job 
 
0.6197 0.6221 0.6097 0.6116 
Communication failure 
 
0.5281 0.5311 0.5051 0.5076 
Poor inspection 
 
0.5391 0.5420 0.5162 0.5186 
Primary pump fails 
 
0.7602 0.7617 0.7263 0.7276 
Gas leak 0.0707 0.0768 0.0583 0.0631 
 
Ignition avoided 
 
0.5916 0.6203 0.5887 0.6163 
Spill size reduction 
 
0.7027 0.7296 0.7100 0.7356 
Escalation prevention 
  
0.6781 0.7057 0.7125 0.7380 
Evacuation 
 
0.8414 0.8609 0.8531 0.8708 
Gas dispersion  
 
0.0387 0.0000 0.0317 0.0000 
Primary explosion  
 
0.0203 0.0000 0.0170 0.0000 
Extensive fire/ 
structural damage  
0.0089 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000 
Massive explosion 
/fireball/rig total loss  
0.0023 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 
Total loss of rig/ 
fatalities  
0.00043 1.0000 0.00029 1.0000 
 
 
It is assumed that when new data become available for all the nodes, the occurrence 
probability for each node is updated using the informative prior distribution obtained from 
HBA. The mean value of the updated distribution for each node represents the updated 
node probability which is used in BN as a prior probability as shown in Table 4.9 (column 
3). The abductive reasoning was performed given the accident occurrence yielding the 
updated nodes probabilities in column 4. 
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4.6  Conclusions 
The present work has illustrated that HBA is a powerful tool for handling data uncertainty. 
Whenever there are different values representing the same parameter, HBA is able to 
incorporate all these values and obtain a distribution for that parameter with mean and 
credible intervals. The mean of the obtained distribution represents the most appropriate 
value for that parameter. HBA is presented as a beneficial technique to overcome one of 
the most challenging problems in risk analysis of major accidents, which is data scarcity. 
This work has shown the effectiveness of HBA in deriving the probabilities of an accident’s 
contributing events, for which a dearth of data is available. Incorporating these 
probabilities via FT, ET or BT in order to obtain the frequency of a major accident may 
introduce a bias in the results. These conventional modeling techniques are still unable 
to handle the uncertainty arising from the model due to some limitation such as events’ 
dependencies and probability updating. These limitations can be relaxed, by mapping the 
conventional technique into BN.  
 
With its ability to update probabilities and represent the dependencies of events, BN is 
able to overcome conventional techniques’ limitations and reduce model uncertainty. The 
proposed methodology in this paper used HBA along with BN in order to consider both 
data uncertainty and model uncertainty in the estimation process of a major accident. 
HBA is used to consider data uncertainty and BN is used as an adaptive model to handle 
model uncertainty. The application of the proposed methodology is demonstrated using 
three cases of offshore accidents. In each case, a different conventional technique is used 
in order to demonstrate the flexibility of this methodology to be applied to various models. 
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This work provides a unique methodology that can be used as a dynamic tool for modeling 
major accidents using sparse data.  
 
As a further step, it is suggested that future research could use experts’ judgments as a 
source of data along with the presented methodology. Experts’ judgments can be a very 
helpful source of data for newly designed installations or processes for which no 
experimental observations are possible. It can also be a good source in cases when it is 
difficult or expensive to perform safety measures, especially in a harsh environment. The 
presented methodology is the best tool to deal with this kind of data.   
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5 Summary, Conclusions and Further Work 
 
5.1 Summary 
This study demonstrates the importance of identifying and considering the uncertainty 
that associated with risk analysis of major accidents. There is always a lack of information 
about the accident’s contributing events as they usually have a low frequency, in addition 
to the lack of understanding and modeling of the accident scenarios. Therefore, there are 
different types of uncertainties associated with the prediction analysis of rare events.  
The first part of this study treated data uncertainty; as the information available about the 
causes of the accident is scarce, relevant data can be collected from different regional 
and global sources. Therefore, to treat the uncertainty that arises in the collected data, 
the methodology developed in this part uses Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) to 
model the collected data for each event by generating a probability distribution with a 
mean value that represents the precise value for the event’s parameter. Events’ 
probabilities obtained by HBA are modeled through Bowtie (BT) analysis in order to obtain 
the probability of a major accident in the case study. 
In the second part of this thesis, the proposed methodology has been improved by using 
HBA along with a Bayesian Network (BN) in order to consider both data uncertainty and 
model uncertainty in the estimation process of a major accident. HBA is used to consider 
data uncertainty and BN is used as an adaptive model to handle model uncertainty. The 
application of the proposed methodology is demonstrated using three cases of offshore 
accidents. In each case, a different conventional technique is used in order to 
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demonstrate the flexibility of this methodology to be applied to various models. Finally, 
this work provides a unique methodology that can be used as a dynamic tool for modeling 
major accidents using sparse data.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
The presented work has illustrated that HBA is a powerful tool for handling data 
uncertainty. Whenever there are different values representing the same parameter, HBA 
is able to incorporate all these values and obtain a distribution for that parameter with 
mean and credible intervals. The mean of the obtained distribution represents the most 
appropriate value for that parameter. HBA is presented as a beneficial technique to 
overcome one of the most challenging problems in risk analysis of major accidents, which 
is data scarcity. This work has shown the effectiveness of HBA in deriving the probabilities 
for the accident’s contributing events, for which a few or no data is available. In similar 
situations, the average value is mainly used as the best estimator to represent an event’s 
parameter value. The relative difference is used as evidence of the effectiveness of the 
developed methodology. Results demonstrate that when dealing with sparse data, the 
new methodology effectively addresses data uncertainty, in addition to its ability to update 
events’ probabilities separately or together when new data become available. 
 
Incorporating the resulting probabilities via Fault tree, Event tree or Bowtie in order to 
obtain the frequency of a major accident may introduce another type of bias in the results. 
These conventional modeling techniques are still unable to handle the uncertainty arising 
from the model due to some limitations such as events’ dependencies and probability 
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updating. These limitations have been relaxed, by mapping the conventional technique 
into BN. BN was able to reduce model uncertainty, with its ability to update probabilities 
and represent the dependencies of events. 
The novelty of this work is the integration of HBA along with BN, which generates a 
powerful tool able to consider both data uncertainty and model uncertainty. The main 
results and conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows:  
 
➢ The ability to cope with data scarcity problem, as the present study provides 
the analyst with the ability to use various types of information and incorporate 
them. 
➢ Data uncertainty is handled. The present study demonstrates the effectiveness 
of HBA over the traditional methods in deriving events’ probabilities for which 
scarce data are available. 
➢ This work provides the analyst with the effective feature of HBA, its ability to 
update events’ probabilities separately or together, in the light of new 
information. 
➢ The developed methodology introduced in this study provides a powerful tool 
by using HBA along with BN. This enables the analyst to use the outstanding 
modeling advantages of BN such as probability updating and the consideration 
of conditional dependent failures. 
➢ Integrating HBA with BN handles both data and model uncertainty 
simultaneously. 
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5.3 Further work 
The present work attempts to introduce new concepts in dealing with data and model 
uncertainty in the field of safety and risk analysis in the oil and gas industries. This work 
can be extended as suggested below: 
➢ In this study, a conjugate families distributions (e.g., Poisson-Gamma or Beta-
Binomial), are used for priors and likelihood functions. However, it is suggested 
that non-conjugate probability distributions can be considered in future studies. 
 
➢ The probabilistic models (i.e., FT, ET, and BT) that constructed in this work to 
illustrate accidents’ scenarios, include only the main causes, safety barriers, 
and consequences. These models can be more complex in future studies, 
considering all the potential causes of the accident. 
   
➢ This work can be improved by a further illustration of the sequential 
dependencies between events; for instance, by considering multi-state events 
in the system.  
 
➢ In addition, it is suggested that future study could integrate the developed 
methodology with the experts’ judgments elicitation process. This would be 
beneficial to use in harsh environments, where there are newly designed 
installations and no experimental observations are possible, as it is usually 
difficult or expensive to perform safety measures. The presented methodology 
is a good tool to deal with this kind of multi- source data. 
